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We devote this article to a study of the user behavior in non-atomic congestion games. Our study will focus
on a particular class of non-atomic congestion games, called scalable games, which includes the well-known
static model of road traffic from Wardrop (1952).
We prove that the price of anarchy of scalable games tends to 1 as the number of users increases, see
Theorem 3.2. This may imply that selfish routing need not be bad. Moreover, we prove that gaugeable
routing games that were recently studied by Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) are special cases of our scalable
games, see Corollary 3.1, Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 for details. Thus, our results generalize those of
Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017). Although our results are much more general, the proofs appear simpler.
For routing games with BPR-travel time functions, we prove that social optimum strategy profiles are
-approximate Nash equilibria for a small  > 0 tending to 0 as travel demands increase, see Theorem 3.5.
Moreover, we prove for these particular games that the price of anarchy equals 1 + O(T−β), where T is
the total travel demand, and β is the degree of the BRP-functions that often equals 4 in practice, see
Theorem 3.6. This confirms a conjecture proposed by O’Hare et al. (2016). Thus, the price of anarchy for
road traffic in practice converges very fast to 1 as the total travel demand increases. In addition, we show
that, when the total travel demand T is large, then the distribution of users among OD pairs is a crucial
factor impacting the costs of both, system optimum strategy profiles and Nash equilibria, see Theorem 3.7.
This does not only supply an approximate method for computing these cost, but also give insights how to
reduce the total travel time, when the total travel demand T is large.
To empirically verify our theoretical findings, we have taken real traffic data within the 2nd ring road
of Beijing as an instance in an experimental study. Our empirical results definitely validate our findings.
In addition, they show that the current traffic in Beijing within that area is already far beyond saturation,
and no route guidance policy can significantly reduce the total travel time for the current huge total travel
demand.
In summary, selfishness in a congestion game with a large number of users need not be bad. It may be
the best choice in a bad environment.
Key words : price of anarchy, user behavior, selfish behavior, non-atomic congestion game, road traffic
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1. Introduction
1.1. Traffic in Beijing
Since several years, traffic congestion has almost become a daily annoyance for every citizen in Bei-
jing. To alleviate traffic congestion, the local government has taken a series of measures, including
the even and odd license plate number rule, license plate lottery, encouraging the use of pub-
lic transportation, and others. These measures definitely have prevented further deterioration of
traffic, but have not completely cured the congestion.
Since 2015, voices calling for congestion pricing continued to come up from the local society.
Congestion pricing is a measure of traffic demand management, which aims to guide the routing
behavior of travelers by collecting tolls on some overloaded roads, see Cole et al. (2003) or Fleischer
et al. (2004). It has been implemented in cities like Singapore, London, Stockholm, Milan and
others. The implementation in Singapore showed that it can considerably reduce traffic congestion
in rush hours in the city center, see Phang and Toh (2004).
To check whether congestion pricing will help in reducing congestion in the center of Beijing, we
launched a study in May 2016. We first computed the price of anarchy (PoA, see Roughgarden and
Tardos (2002)), so as to get an overall impression of the current traffic performance within that
area. The concept of PoA stems from Papadimitriou (2001) and measures the inefficiency of user
selfish behavior in a congestion game (Rosenthal 1973), i.e., the larger the PoA, the more inefficient
the user behavior is. Specific to road traffic, the PoA measures the inefficiency of selfish routing
(Roughgarden and Tardos 2004). Surprisingly, the computational outcome showed that the PoA
within that area almost equals 1, see Section 4 for details. This means that selfish route choices
within that area are almost the most efficient ones, which certainly shocked us! We were thus eager
for a theoretical explanation of this peculiar result, which has motivated this article. This has led
to a closer inspection of the PoA of congestion games presented in this paper.
1.2. Congestion games
Congestion games, see Rosenthal (1973) or Roughgarden and Tardos (2004), are non-cooperative
games. In a congestion game, users (players) are usually classified into K different groups for some
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integer K ∈ N+. Associated with each group k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, there is a user volume dk ≥ 0 and a
finite set Sk containing all strategies only available to the users belonging to that group. Each user
needs to determine a strategy to follow, and each strategy consumes certain amounts of resources.
Available resources are collected in a finite set A, and each resource a∈A has a consumption price
function τa(·) depending only on the consumed volume of resource a. A feasible strategy profile
is a vector f = (fs)s∈S in which each component fs ≥ 0 represents the volume (or number) of
users choosing strategy s. The social cost C(f) of a feasible strategy profile f is just the total
expense of all users under profile f. Our study will only consider non-atomic congestion games, see
Schmeidler (1973) or Nisan et al. (2007), in which users are assumed to be infinitesimal, i.e., they
have negligible ability to affect the others, and the consumption price functions τa(·) of resources
a are assumed to be non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous.
Popular examples of non-atomic congestion games are the static traffic routing games of Wardrop
(1952), in which A is the set of arcs (streets) of an underlying road network, the K groups are the
K different origin-destination pairs, Sk is the set of paths connecting the k-th origin-destination
pair, dk is the travel demand from the k-th origin to the k-th destination, τa(·) is the travel time
function on arc a, a feasible strategy profile f is a just feasible traffic flow assigning every user
(traveler) to a feasible path, and the social cost of f is the total travel time of all users.
1.3. The price of anarchy
Users are often completely selfish, i.e., they tend to use strategies minimizing their own cost. This
selfish behavior will lead the underlying system into a so-called Wardrop equilibrium, see Wardrop
(1952), at which every user adopts a strategy with minimum cost for him. In our study, Wardrop
equilibria coincide with pure Nash equilibria, at which users are unlikely to change their strategies
since an unilateral change in strategy will not introduce any extra profit. Throughout this paper, we
shall only consider pure Nash equilibria and just use the term Nash equilibria or NE for simplicity.
By Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) and Correa et al. (2005), all Nash (or equivalently, Wardrop)
equilibria have equal cost under our setting of non-decreasing and continuous consumption price
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functions. Besides Nash equilibria, feasible profiles having minimum total (social) cost are of great
interest. Such profiles are called system optimum strategy profiles and any two of them also have
the same cost. In our study, the PoA is just the ratio of the cost of a Nash equilibrium over the cost
of a system optimum strategy profile. System optimum strategy profiles can be thought of as the
best choice the users should take so as to achieve a social optimum, while Nash equilibria model
possible choices that users will take in practice. Thus, the PoA indeed reflects the inefficiency of
the practical (selfish) user behavior to a certain extent.
It is almost folklore that selfish user behavior is inefficient in congestion games, see Nisan et al.
(2007). A prominent example demonstrating this inefficiency is Pigous’s example, see Nisan et al.
(2007) or Figure 1, in which the PoA can be made as large as possible. To deepen the understanding
of the inefficiency, worst-case upper bounds of the PoA of congestion games with particular types
of consumption prices functions τa(·) have been studied in recent years. Roughgarden and Tardos
(2002) proved that the worst-case upper bound equals 4/3, if all τa(·) are affine linear. Roughgarden
(2003) proved that the worst-case upper bound of the PoA of routing games actually does not
depend on the underlying road network topology, but on the types of travel time functions τa(·).
Roughgarden and Tardos (2004) further obtained worst-case upper bounds for the PoA for some
general classes of consumption price functions τa(·). Particularly, they proved that the worst-case
upper bound equals Θ(β/ lnβ) if all τa(·) are polynomials with the same maximum degree β > 0.
For more results on worst-case upper bounds, readers may refer to Roughgarden and Tardos (2007).
1.4. The inadequacy of the PoA for large demand
Our study will not consider worst-case upper bounds. Actually, a worst-case upper bound is not
a fair measurement of the inefficiency. Figure 1 below shows Pigous’s example from Nisan et al.
(2007). It is a routing game with only K = 1 origin-destination pair (o, t) and two arcs with travel
time functions xβ and 1, respectively, for some constant β > 0. The PoA of this example equals
T/
(
T − (β+1)−1/β +(β+1)−1), where T ≥ 1 is the total travel demand from origin o to destination
t. Obviously, considering all possible β, the worst-case upper bound of the PoA is infinity, since it
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o t
1
xβ
Figure 1 Pigou’s example
tends to ∞ as β→∞ if T = 1. However, if we consider a large enough T, then the PoA will be
very close to 1 for every β > 0. This means that selfish user behavior is efficient when the total
user volume T is large. Thus, selfish user behavior actually need not be bad.
Inspired by Pigous’s example, we aim to understand the aforementioned PoA for Beijing by
inspecting conditions which guarantee that the PoA approaches 1 as the total user volume T =∑K
k=1 dk increases. To obtain a general result, our analysis will not stick to the Beijing instance,
but consider general non-atomic congestion games.
1.5. Related work
Parallel studies have been recently done by Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016) and Colini-Baldeschi
et al. (2017). Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016) proved that for routing games with a network consisting
of parallel arcs linking a single origin-destination pair, the PoA converges to 1 as the total travel
demand (i.e. total user volume) T →∞.
Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) continued the study of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016), and analyzed
the asymptotic behavior of the PoA for gaugeable routing games. These are routing games in which
all travel time functions τa(·) are gaugeable by a regularly varying function g(·), which means that
limt→∞ τa(t)/g(t) = ca for some constant ca ∈ [0,+∞]. See Bingham et al. (1987) for a definition of
regular variation. Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) proved that, if the underlying game is gaugeable,
then the PoA approaches 1 with T =
∑T
k=1 dk →∞, see Theorem 4.1 of Colini-Baldeschi et al.
(2017). The study of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) assumes that there is a uniform gauge function
g(·), and that the user volume vector (dk)k=1,...,K keeps a certain pattern when the total user volume
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T =
∑K
k=1 dk increases, i.e., the total user volume of so-called tight groups always accounts for a
non-negligible proportion of T =
∑K
k=1 dk, see Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) for details. As we will
see, these two assumptions limit the generality of their results.
1.6. Our results
Our study does not assume these restrictions. We propose a new concept called scalability, and
study two kinds of games related to scalability, i.e., the class of scalable games and its subclass of
strongly scalable games, see Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2, respectively. The concept of scalability
allows us to analyze the convergence of the PoA in a sequence-dependent style, i.e., for each
sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors with total user volume T (d(n)) :=
∑K
k=1 d
(n)
k →+∞, we
independently discuss the convergence of the PoA with the help of a scaling sequence of positive
numbers that is specific to {d(n)}n∈N. Thus, we do not need a uniform gauge function g(·) for all
sequences of user volume vectors. Moreover, our scalability focuses on the existence of a suitable
limit game, which will avoid additional assumptions on the structure of the user volume vectors.
We show that the PoA of each scalable game converges to 1 as the total user volume T =∑K
k=1 dk → +∞, see Theorem 3.2, and that every gaugeable game is scalable, see Corollary 3.1.
Moreover, we show that gaugeable games and strongly scalable games concide if the consumption
price functions τa(·) are mutually comparable, see Theorem 3.3. However, when the consumption
price functions τa(·) are not mutually comparable, our class of strongly scalable games is more
extensive, see Theorem 3.4. As a side result, we show by examples that scalable games are indeed
more general than strongly scalable games, see Example 3.7.
In the study of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), the regular variation of the gauge function g(·) plays
a pivotal role, and their proofs heavily depend on the properties of regularly varying functions. In
our study, we do not need the regular variation. The existence of limit games makes our proof of
Theorem 3.2 simpler compared to that of Theorem 4.1 in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), although
the result is more general.
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Our study of general non-atomic congestion games implies that the PoA of each routing game
with U.S. Bureau of Public Road (BPR) travel time functions τa(·), see Bureau of Public Roads
(1964), converges to 1 as the total travel demand T increases. This definitely explains our empirical
finding about the PoA for the Beijing instance. To deepen the understanding of the convergence,
we inspect routing games with BPR-travel time functions τa(·) more closely. We show that sys-
tem optimum strategy profiles of these games are -approximate Nash equilibria for a small  ∈
O
(
min{d−β1 , . . . , d−βK }
)
, see Theorem 3.5, where β > 0 is a parameter of the BPR-functions which
often equals 4 in practice. The concept of -approximate Nash equilibrium is due to Roughgarden
and Tardos (2002) and models practical user behavior more closely by taking possible imprecise
judgements of users on tiny differences between travel times of two paths into account. In practice,
users may not follow the best Nash equilibrium, but an -approximate Nash equilibrium. Theo-
rem 3.5 indicates that users will unknowingly, by their selfish behavior, follow the paths of system
optimum strategy profiles when user volumes are large.
In addition, we prove that the PoA of these particular games equals 1+O(T−β), see Theorem 3.6.
This result proves a conjecture proposed by O’Hare et al. (2016) stating that the PoA of routing
games with BPR travel time functions will with increasing total demand eventually enter a region
of decay that can be characterized by a power law. So, the PoA will converge very quickly to 1,
as the total volume T increases. Our convergence rate O(T−β) also improves the convergence rate
of O(T−1) shown in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), since β = 4 in practice. Furthermore, we prove
that the distribution of users among origin-destination pairs is a principal factor for the cost of
both, Nash equilibria and system optimum strategy profiles when the total travel demand T is
large, see Theorem 3.7. This does not only supply an approximate method for computing these
two cost values, but also brings some insight how to reduce the total travel time when the total
travel demand T is large, see the discussion following Theorem 3.7 in Subsection 3.2 for details.
Theorem 3.5, Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.7 actually indicate that congestion pricing has no
effect when the total travel demand T is large and not reduced. Generally, congestion pricing
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concerns enforcing a certain traffic pattern (i.e., a traffic flow) through tolling streets (arcs), see
Cole et al. (2003), Fleischer et al. (2004), and Harks et al. (2015). Preferred traffic patterns are
often those at system optimum (Cole et al. 2003), or at constrained system optimum (Jahn et al.
2005). Our results show that when T is large, user behavior itself will naturally lead the system
into a system optimum. Thus, we do not need to additionally employ congestion pricing to enforce
the system optimum, when the travel demand T is already large. Constrained system optima (Jahn
et al. 2005) aim at balancing total travel time and user fairness. Jahn et al. (2005) showed that the
inherent unfairness of the system optimum can be reduced by restricting route choices while still
improving the PoA. Unfairness means that the travel times of some users are significantly larger
than their travel times at Nash equilibra. Nash equilibria can be thought of as the fairest traffic
patterns, since all users follow the quickest path they could follow. According to our study, Nash
equilibria themselves already perfectly balance the total travel time and user fairness when the
total travel demand T is large enough. Therefore, we do not need to additionally employ congestion
pricing to enforce other traffic patterns for the same demand, since they could only increase the
total travel time.
To empirically verify our theoretical findings, we conducted a more detailed computational study
with real traffic data within the second ring road of Beijing. The empirical results validate our
theoretical findings. They show, in particular, that the current traffic in Beijing is already far
beyond saturation, and any traffic guidance policy (particularly, congestion pricing) will fail in
reducing the total travel time for the huge total travel demand of Beijing.
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows. Section 2 formalizes non-atomic congestion
games. Section 3 reports our theoretical results, the proofs of which are collected in an Appendix
so as to improve readability. Section 4 reports the empirical results from our experimental study
of the Beijing instance. We conclude with a short summary in Section 5.
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2. The model
2.1. Non-atomic congestion games
Our study considers non-atomic congestion games. Non-atomic congestion games are non-
cooperative and complete information games, see Nisan et al. (2007), in which users need to choose
strategies, and the utility of each user depends only on the volume (number) of users using the
same or overlapping strategies. Definition 2.1 formally defines them.
Definition 2.1 A non-atomic congestion game (NCG) is a tuple
Γ =
(
A,S,K, (r(a, s))
a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, (dk)
K
k=1
)
where
1. A is a finite set of available resources or public facilities,
2. K ∈N+ represents the number of groups of users (players),
3. S =⋃Kk=1 Sk is a finite set of strategies, where each Sk contains strategies only available to
users from group k for all k= 1, . . . ,K,
4. each r(a, s)≥ 0 is a constant representing the volume of resource a demanded (consumed) by
a user using strategy s∈ S, for all a∈A and s∈ S,
5. each τa : [0,+∞) 7→ [0,+∞) is a continuous and nondecreasing consumption price function of
resource a, which depends only on the total demanded volume of resource a, for all a∈A,
6. d := (dk)k=1,...,K is a user volume vector (also called user demand vector) such that
each component dk ≥ 0 represents the volume (or demand) of users belonging to group k, for all
k= 1, . . . ,K.
Our definition of NCGs is slightly different from the classic one in the literature, see e.g. Roughgar-
den and Tardos (2002), Roughgarden and Tardos (2004), and Bingham et al. (1987). Traditionally,
every strategy s∈ S is assumed to be a set of resources from A. In our study, we do not assume this.
The constants r(a, s) are employed to indicate the relation between resources a∈A and strategies
s∈ S. Here, we assume that ∑
a∈A
r(a, s)> 0 ∀s∈ S, (2.1)
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and ∑
s∈S
r(a, s)> 0 ∀a∈A, (2.2)
so every strategy s ∈ S consumes a certain amount of resources and every resource a ∈A is con-
sumed by some strategies.
Given an NCG Γ, we denote by T :=
∑K
k=1 dk the total user volume of Γ. In our study, the user
volume vector d= (dk)k=1,...,K is not assumed to be fixed, and neither is the total volume T .
A feasible strategy profile (simply called profile or strategy profile in the sequel) f of an NCG Γ
is a vector (fs)s∈S , such that
∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk ∀k= 1, . . . ,K, (2.3)
fs ≥ 0 ∀s∈ S, (2.4)
where fs is the volume of users adopting strategy s. (2.3) means that a feasible strategy profile
fulfills all demands, i.e., it distributes all users to available strategies.
Given a feasible strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S , the total demand of resource a∈A is defined by
fa :=
∑
s∈S
r(a, s)fs =
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s)fs,
where r(a, s)fs is the demanded volume of resource a by users using strategy s w.r.t. profile f.
Then, the price of a strategy s (i.e., the cost of a user using strategy s) under profile f is
τs(f) :=
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τa(fa).
Finally, the corresponding social cost (or cost for simplicity) of the feasible strategy profile f is
C(f):=
∑
a∈A
τa(fa)fa=
∑
a∈A
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τa(fa)r(a, s)fs=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
fs · τs(f),
which is just the resulting total cost of the T many users of the NCG.
In NCGs, strategy profiles at system optimum and at Nash equilibrium are of great interest.
Strategy profiles at system optimum are often thought of the most ideal profiles, which users are
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hoped to adopt. Strategy profiles at Nash equilibrium reflect the user behavior in practice, and can
be used to forecast the behavior of users. Formally, a feasible strategy profile is at social optimum
(SO) if it minimizes the social cost. A feasible strategy profile is an Nash equilibrium (NE) if for
each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and any two strategies s, s′ ∈ Sk, τs(f) ≤ τs′(f) if fs > 0. So if s is used, it
should be one of the cheapest! In the sequel, to facilitate our discussion, we shall call a strategy
profile at Nash equilibrium an NE-profile, and a strategy profile at social optimum an SO-profile.
2.2. The routing games for static road traffic
A typical NCG example is the routing game for static road traffic from Wardrop (1952), where
(a) the resource set A is the set of arcs (streets) of a directed graph (road network) G= (V,A),
(b) the consumption price function τa : [0,+∞) 7→ [0,+∞) is just the flow-dependent travel time
function of arc a∈A, which is usually assumed to be continuous and non-decreasing,
(c) each user group k corresponds to an origin-destination (OD) pair (ok, tk), where ok, tk ∈ V,
for k= 1, . . . ,K,
(d) dk corresponds to the travel demand from ok to tk, for k= 1, . . . ,K,
(e) Sk corresponds to the set of all paths from ok to tk of graph G= (V,A), for k= 1, . . . ,K,
(f) the constant r(a, s) is now the indicator function of the relation “a ∈ s”, which is {0,1}-
valued, and equals 1 iff arc a belongs to path s,
(g) a feasible strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S is now a feasible traffic flow fulfilling all the travel
demands, and the social cost of f is just the total travel time of the users.
In road traffic, τa(·) is often assumed to be a so-called BPR-function Bureau of Public Roads
(1964), i.e.,
τa(x) = τa(0)
(
1 +α
( x
ua
)β)
= τa(0) +
ατa(0)
uβa
xβ := γax
β + ηa, (2.5)
where τa(0) := ηa is the free-flow travel time (the basic cost) of street a∈A, ua > 0 represents the
capacity (total volume) of street (resource) a∈A, and β,α > 0 are constants independent of streets.
Constants ua and τa(0) reflect road conditions such as street length, lane numbers, speed limits,
etc. Constants β,α reflect the growth of the travel time with the increase of the traffic intensity.
In practice, one often takes β = 4 and α= 0.15.
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2.3. The price of anarchy
The natural (selfish) behavior of users in congestion games is usually considered to be inefficient,
see, e.g., Ch. 18 of Nisan et al. (2007) for a survey. The inefficiency is usually measured by the PoA
which, under our setting of non-decreasing and continuous consumption price functions, equals the
ratio of the cost of an NE-profile over the cost of an SO-profile, i.e.,
PoA =
C(f˜)
C(f∗)
≥ 1,
where f˜ is an NE-profile, and f∗ is an SO-profile.
Pigous’s example, see Nisan et al. (2007) or Figure 1, has already shown that selfish behavior
need not be bad for large T . However, this example is too artificial to be a convincing evidence. To
further understand the possible efficiency of user behavior, we still need a closer inspection of the
PoA of NCGs. For this purpose, we introduce the following two definitions. The first one concerns
the design of a game, in which the nature (selfishness) of users automatically minimizes social cost.
Such games are “perfect” to a certain extent. However, they might be too restrictive for congestion
games in practice. The second definition gives a more practical alternative. We will show later that
many congestion games possess this property.
Definition 2.2 We call an NCG Γ a well designed game (WDG) if the cost of NE-profiles
equals the cost of SO-profiles for all possible user volume vectors d= (dk)k=1,...,K with T =
∑T
k=1 dk >
0. Throughout the paper, we shall denote by WDG also the class of all well designed NCGs.
Obviously, user behavior is completely efficient in a well designed game. Example 2.1 below gives
examples of well designed games.
Example 2.1 An NCG Γ, whose resource consumption price functions have the form τa(x) =
αax
β for some constants αa ≥ 0 and a constant β ≥ 0 independent of resources, is well designed.
This can be easily seen by observing the necessary and sufficient conditions for NE-profiles and
SO-profiles proposed in Roughgarden and Tardos (2002).
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Definition 2.3 We call an NCG Γ an asymptotically well designed game (AWDG) if the
PoA of the game approaches 1 as T =
∑K
k=1 dk approaches infinity. In the sequel, we denote by
AWDG also the class of all asymptotically well designed NCGs.
Obviously, WDG ⊆ AWDG, but WDG 6= AWDG. For instance, Pigous’s example belongs to
AWDG, but not WDG. Note that Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) have already shown an example
of NCGs which do not belong to AWDG. Thus, WDG ( AWDG ( NCGs. Section 3 will explore
more properties of AWDG.
3. User behavior need not be bad
User behavior in an AWDG need not be bad, but may eventually lead the underlying system into
an equilibrium close to an social optimum. Thus, it is worth exploring which NCGs belong to
AWDG. This will require us to analyze the convergence of the PoA of NCGs. We will devote
this Section to such an analysis. We shall discuss conditions which can guarantee that the PoA
converges to 1 as the total volume T increases to infinity.
The first condition is the so-called gaugeability proposed by Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017). They
proved that every gaugeable routing game is an AWDG, see the Theorem 4.1 of Colini-Baldeschi
et al. (2017). A gaugeable routing game is an NCG Γ possessing the following four properties.
(G1) There exists a regularly varying function g(·) such that τa(x)/g(x)→ ca with x→∞ for
every resource a ∈ A, where ca ∈ [0,+∞] is a constant depending only on resource a. A function
g(·) is said to be regularly varying if limt→∞ g(tx)/g(x) is finite and nonzero for all x> 0.
(G2) For each a∈A and s∈ S, r(a, s) = 1s(a) is the indicator function of the relation “a∈ s”.
(G3) For each k= 1, . . . ,K, there exists a strategy s∈ Sk such that
cs := max{ca : a∈A, and r(a, s) = 1} ∈ [0,+∞).
Such a strategy is called tight, and so (G3) says that every group has a tight strategy.
(G4) The total user volume of tight groups accounts for a non-negligible proportion of the total
user volume T as T →∞, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
T tight
T
> 0,
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where a user group k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is called tight if
min
s∈Sk
cs = min
s∈Sk
max{ca : a∈A, and r(a, s) = 1} ∈ (0,+∞),
and T tight :=
∑
k is tight dk.
Actually, one can easily provide examples of NCGs that are in AWDG, but not gaugeable, even
in the context of road traffic. The proof of Theorem 3.1 presents such an example. Other examples
are given in Theorem 3.4 and Example 3.1. Theorem 3.1 below indicates that there are many
games in AWDG that are not gaugeable. Thus, we need a more general condition to analyze the
convergence of the PoA.
Theorem 3.1 There exist routing games in AWDG that are not gaugeable.
The results of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) require the existence of a uniform gauge function
g(·) of the underlying game, i.e., a common regularly varying gauge function g(·) for all a ∈ A,
see Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) or (G1). The regular variation of the gauge function g(·) plays a
crucial role in the study of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017). It indicates that the consumption price
functions τa(x) vary only moderately with the variation of x. Moreover, the gaugeability in Colini-
Baldeschi et al. (2017) heavily depends on the structure of the user volume vectors d= (dk)k=1,...,K .
It requires that the total user volume of tight groups accounts for a non-negligible proportion of
the total volume T, see (G4). These two features of gaugeability greatly restrict the generality of
(G4). To derive a weaker condition, we must avoid these two restrictions. In Subsection 3.1, we
will propose a new concept called scalability, and define two kinds of games related to scalability,
namely, scalable games and strongly scalable games. Different from the gaugeability in Colini-
Baldeschi et al. (2017), our notion of scalability does neither assume the existence of a uniform
gauge function, nor a particular structure of user volume vectors d= (dk)k=1,...,K . This will make
our results much more general.
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3.1. Analyzing the convergence of the PoA in general non-atomic congestion games
Our approach will use a normalization of the model specified in Subsection 2.1, which stems from
Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017). It concerns the distribution of users among groups, and also among
strategies of an arbitrary strategy profile. Let us start with details of this normalization.
Let d= (dk)k=1,...,K be a user volume vector with total volume T (d) =
∑K
k=1 dk. We employ the
notation T (d) to explicitly note the dependence of T on d. In the sequel, we may still directly use
T instead of T (d) so as to simplify notation when the vector d is unambiguous.
We denote by dk := dk/T (d) the proportion of the k-th volume dk in the total volume T (d)
w.r.t. the given vector d for every k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, the vector d :=
(
dk
)
k=1,...,K
represents the
distribution of the K user group volumes w.r.t. vector d.
For a feasible strategy profile f = (fs)s∈S and a strategy s ∈ S, we denote by fs := fs/T (d) the
proportion of users choosing strategy s in profile f w.r.t. vector d. Then, the vector f :=
(
fs
)
s∈S
represents the distribution of users among strategies in profile f w.r.t. vector d. Obviously,
∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk ∀k= 1, . . . ,K, (3.1)
fs ≥ 0 ∀s∈ S. (3.2)
With this normalization, we can further define the resource load rate vector, i.e., the normalized
demand volume vector of resources. For every a∈A, let fa :=
∑
s∈S r(a, s) ·fs denote the load rate
of resource a for profile f w.r.t. vector d. Then,
(
fa
)
a∈A is the load rate vector corresponding to
the demand volume vector (fa)a∈A of resources. Obviously,
fa =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · fs = T (d) ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) ·fs = T (d) ·fa (3.3)
for all resources a∈A.
For a fixed distribution d= (dk)k=1,...,K of users among groups, the load rate fa of a resource
a ∈A is said to be admissible to the distribution d if there is a distribution f = (fs)s∈S of users
among strategies such that f is feasible w.r.t. the distribution d, i.e., f satisfies (3.1) and (3.2),
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and fa =
∑
s∈S r(a, s) · fs. Note that values of fa admissible to a distribution d form a closed
interval Ia(d) on R+ ∪ {0}, i.e., Ia(d) = [va,wa] for some constants wa, va with 0≤ wa ≤ va. This
can be easily proved by observing first that if f and f ′ are both feasible w.r.t. distribution d, then
(1− κ)f + κf ′ is also feasible w.r.t. d for any constant κ ∈ [0,1], and second that if f (n)a → fa as
n→∞ for a sequence {f (n)a }n∈N of load rates of resource a that are admissible to d, then fa is
again a load rate of a admissible to d. For each a∈A, let Ia :=
⋃
d Ia(d) be the set of all admissible
values of fa, where d ranges over all distributions. Similar arguments show that Ia is also a closed
interval of R+ ∪{0}.
By (3.3), the social cost of a feasible profile f can be rewritten as
C(f) =
∑
a∈A
fa · τa(fa) =
∑
a∈A
T (d) ·fa · τa
(
T (d) ·fa
)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
fs ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τa(fa)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
T (d) ·fs ·
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · τa
(
T (d) ·fa
)
,
(3.4)
which will be frequently used in the sequel.
Given an NCG
Γd =
(
A,K,S, (r(a, s))
a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
(where the subscript d is employed to show the dependence of Γ on the user volume vector d
explicitly), and a constant c∈R+, we denote by
Γd/c :=
(
A,K,S, (r(a, s))
a∈A,s∈S , (τa)a∈A,d
)
with τa(fa) :=
τa(T (d) ·fa)
c
the scaled game of Γd under the scaling factor c. Here, τa(fa) is the scaled consumption price
function for all a ∈A and all fa ∈ Ia(d). Obviously, the distribution f of a feasible profile f of Γd
is a feasible profile of the scaled game Γd/c. In the sequel, we will use bold-face symbols for scaled
games. Table 1 list them and their counterparts in the original games.
By (3.4), the PoA of the scaled game Γd/c equals the PoA of the original game Γd, since the
distribution f˜ of an NE-profile f˜ of the original game Γd is an NE-profile of the scaled game Γd/c,
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Table 1 Symbols in original and scaled games
Original Scaled with scaling factor c > 0
d= (dk)k=1,...,K d= (dk)k=1,...,K
dk =
∑
s∈Sk fs dk = dk/T (d) =
∑
s∈Sk fs∑K
k=1 dk = T (d)
∑K
k=1 dk = 1
f = (fs)s∈S f = (fs)s∈S
fs fs = fs/T (d)
fa =
∑
a∈A r(a, s)fs = T (d) ·fa fa =
∑
a∈A r(a, s)fs
τa(fa) τa(fa) =
τa(T (d)·fa)
c
C(f)=
∑
a∈A fa · τa(fa) C(f)=
∑
a∈A fa · τa(fa)= C(f)c·T (d)
and the distribution f∗ of an SO-profile f∗ of the original game Γd is an SO-profile of the scaled
game Γd/c.
Recall that every user volume vector d only has a unique social cost for NE-profiles, since we
assume that all consumption price functions τa(·) are continuous and non-decreasing (see Rough-
garden and Tardos (2002) or Smith (1979)). We can therefore consider the PoA of the original
game Γd as a function of the user volume vector d. To indicate this clearly, we will denote the PoA
corresponding to a user volume vector d by PoA(d). Note that PoA(d) is also the PoA of the scaled
game Γd/c for every scaling factor c > 0.
We will study the convergence of PoA(d) by inspecting the convergence of scaled games under
a suitable sequence of scaling factors. To this end, we need to formalize the scaling of NCGs.
Definition 3.1 below defines the concept of scalable games. It roughly states that the limit of a
sequence of scaled games exists for a suitable sequence of scaling factors.
Definition 3.1 We say that an NCG
Γ =
(
A,K,S, (r(a, s))
a∈A;s∈S , (τa)a∈A, d
)
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is scalable if for any sequence {d(n) = (d(n)k )k=1,...,K}n∈N of user volume vectors with total volume
T (d(n))→∞, there exist an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N, and a scaling sequence {gi}i∈N of positive
numbers such that:
(S0) The distributions d(ni) =
(
d
(ni)
k
)
k=1,...,K
converge to d= (dk)k=1,...,K for some distribution
vector d as i→∞.
(S1) There exists a limit price function vector (la)a∈A such that every la(·), defined on Ia,
is either a non-decreasing function with range [0,+∞), or la(fa)≡+∞ for all fa ∈ Ia ∩ (0,+∞).
(S2) For all resources a ∈A and all fa ∈ Ia, the scaled consumption price function τa(fa) with
scaling factor gi converges to the limit price function la(fa) as i→∞, i.e.,
lim
i→∞
τa
(
T (d(ni)) ·fa
)
gi
= la(fa). (3.5)
Moreover, if la(fa) < +∞, then the limit price function la(x) of resource a is continuous at the
point x= fa.
(S3) Every group k= 1, . . . ,K is either negligible, i.e., the total cost of the group k
∑
s∈Sk
f (ni)s
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τa(f (ni)a )
T (d(ni))gi
→ 0 as i→+∞, (3.6)
where f (ni) is an arbitrary feasible profile w.r.t. the user volume d(ni) for each i∈N, or has a tight
strategy s∈ Sk, where tight means that the limit price function la(·) of resource a has range [0,+∞),
i.e., la(·) is finite for every resource a∈A with r(a, s)> 0.
(S4) NE-profiles and SO-profiles of the limit game
Γ∞ :=
(
Atight,K,Stight, (r(a, s))
a∈Atight,s∈Stight , (la)a∈Atight ,d
)
have equal cost under (the limit distribution) d as user volume vector. Here, Stight :=⋃Kk=1 Stightk ,
Stightk denotes the set of tight strategies belonging to Sk, and Atight ⊆A is the set of all resources a
with r(a, s)> 0 for some s∈ Stight.
(S5) The cost of NE-profiles of the limit game is positive under (the limit distribution) d as user
volume vector.
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In the sequel, we denote by SG the class of all scalable NCGs. We call the limit game Γ∞ the limit
of the scaled games Γd(ni)/gi. Note that the existence of a convergent subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N of the
distribution vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N in (S0) of Definition 3.1 is not a real restriction, since the
sequence {d(n)}n∈N is bounded. Note also that every limit price function la(·) is only required to
exist on the interval Ia, i.e., the set of all admissible load rate fa of resource a∈A. Conditions (S1)
and (S2) imply that every consumption price function la(·) of Γ∞ is non-decreasing and continuous
on the interval Ia. Conditions (S3) and (S5) require that the scaling sequence {gi}i∈N should be
moderately large compared to the consumption prices, which will guarantee that Γ∞ is well defined.
Condition (S4) means that Nash equilibria of Γ∞ are social optima.
Compared to the gaugeability in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), our notion of scalability is more
flexible. We do not require a uniform function g(·) to gauge the underlying game. Instead, we
allow different sequences {d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors to have different scaling sequences, and
the existence of a scalable subsequence {dni}i∈N of {d(n)}n∈N is already sufficient for our results.
In addition, our definition of scalability does not distinguish between user groups, and does not
assume particular distributions of users among groups. Thus, our definition of scalability is indeed
weaker than that of gaugeability.
Theorem 3.2 below shows that every scalable game is asymptotically well designed, i.e., belongs
to AWDG. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is inspired by that of Theorem 4.1 in Colini-Baldeschi et al.
(2017). However, we do not need any properties of regular varying functions. Because of conditions
(S4) and (S5), we only need to show that the scaled costs of both, NE-profiles and SO-profiles
converge, and that the limit distributions of NE-profiles under scaling sequences {gi}i∈N are again
NE-profiles of the limit games, see the Appendix for a detailed proof. Thus, our proof is much
simpler compared to that of Theorem 4.1 in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017).
Theorem 3.2 Every scalable game is asymptotically well designed, and so belongs to AWDG.
Although our condition is weaker, all results of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) carry over to
our study. Corollary 3.1 below states that every gaugeable game is scalable. Thus, Theorem 3.2
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generalizes Theorem 4.1 of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), although our proof of Theorem 3.2 appears
to be much simpler.
Corollary 3.1 Every gaugeable game is scalable.
Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 below give particular examples of scalable games. Moreover,
Corollary 3.3 actually provides evidence that scalable games are indeed more general than gaugeable
games. To see this, one can take a non-regularly varying travel time function for the dominating
arc b in Corollary 3.3, and see that the resulting game is not gaugeable, but still scalable.
Corollary 3.2 Every NCG with polynomial resource consumption price functions τa(·) of the same
non-negative degree is scalable, and therefore belongs to AWDG.
We call an arc b ∈A of a routing game dominating if every feasible path s ∈ S uses arc b, i.e.,
b∈ s for every path s∈ S, and if arc b is much slower than all other arcs, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
τa
(
t ·fa
)
τb
(
t ·fb
) = 0.
for all feasible distributions f = (fs)s∈S of users among groups with load rate vector (fa)a∈A, and
for all arcs a ∈A with a 6= b. A routing game with a dominating arc models a traffic system such
that all OD pairs share a common arc, which might be the case in large cities with an obvious
separation in living and working areas, e.g., by a river with only one bridge. Corollary 3.3 states
that such games belong to AWDG. Thus, the PoA of such games will tend to 1 as total user volume
increases.
Corollary 3.3 Every routing game with a dominating arc is scalable, and thus belongs to AWDG.
We will now inspect the relation between scalability and gaugeability more closely. Recall that
our definition of scalability in Definition 3.1 requires that every sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume
vectors has a subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N such that the limit of the scaled games w.r.t. this subsequence
exists. However, we actually proved a much stronger version of this scalability in the proofs of
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Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.2. In particular, the proof of Corollary 3.1 shows that gaugeability
is a special case of this stronger version. Thus, for a better understanding of the relation between
gaugeability and scalability, we need to study the stronger version of scalability. Definition 3.2
formally defines this stronger version of scalability.
Definition 3.2 We say that an NCG Γ is strongly scalable if for every sequence {d(n)}n∈N of
user volume vectors with total volume T (d(n))→ +∞, there exists a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N of
positive numbers, such that:
(SS1) The limit price
la(x) = lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n)) ·x)
gn
exists for every resource a∈A and every x≥ 0, and la(x) is either a non-negative, non-decreasing
and continuous real function, or equals +∞ for all x> 0.
(SS2) There exists an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N such that:
(SS2.1) All groups without tight strategies are negligible for the subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N.
(SS2.2) The subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N of the distribution vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N correspond-
ing to the user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N converges to a limit distribution d. Moreove, there
exists a group k0 with dk0 > 0 such that for all strategies s ∈ Sk0 there is a resource a ∈ A with
r(a, s)> 0 and la(x)∈ (0,+∞) for all x> 0.
(SS2.3) NE-profiles and SO-profiles of the limit game Γ∞ have equal cost w.r.t. user volume
vector d, where Γ∞ is defined as in Definition 3.1.
Obviously, a strongly scalable game is scalable, where we observe that (SS2.2) guarantees that the
NE-profiles of Γ∞ w.r.t. d are positive. There are two significant differences between scalability and
strong scalability. Strong scalability requires that the limit game exists w.r.t. the whole sequence
{d(n)}n∈N of user volume vectors and the limit price functions la(·) are defined on [0,+∞), while
scalability only requires that the limit game exists w.r.t. to some subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N of {d(n)}n∈N
and that the limit price functions la(·) are defined on the closed intervals Ia. In the sequel, we shall
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denote by SSG the class of all strongly scalable games. By Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.3, we
obtain that
gaugeable games⊆SSG⊆SG⊆AWDG(NCGs and gaugeable games(SG.
Now, we aim to further understand the relation between gaugeable and strongly scalable games.
We say that two non-negative real-valued functions h1(·), h2(·) are asymptotically comparable if
there exists a constant c∈ (0,+∞) such that
lim
x→+∞
h1(x)
h2(x)
= c ∀x> 0.
An NCG is said to have mutually comparable consumption price functions if their consumption
price functions τa(·) and τb(·) are asymptotically comparable for every two resources a, b ∈ A.
Theorem 3.3 below characterizes strongly scalable NCGs with mutually comparable consumption
price functions τa(·). It states that an NCG with mutually comparable consumption price functions
τa(·) is strongly scalable if and only if all the consumption price functions τa(·) are regularly varying
with the same exponent ρ > 0, i.e., limt→∞
τa(tx)
τa(x)
= xρ for all x > 0. Thus, when the consumption
price functions are mutually comparable, strongly scalable games coincide with gaugeable games.
Moreover, Theorem 3.3 extends Corollary 4.8 of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), in which they proved
that routing games with mutually comparable and regularly varying travel time functions are
gaugeable, if the proportion of the user volume of each group in the total volume is asymptotically
bounded away from 0. We do not need this assumption.
Theorem 3.3 Consider an NCG Γ. If all consumption price functions τa(·) are mutually com-
parable, then Γ is strongly scalable if and only if all τa(·) are regularly varying and have the same
exponent in the limit xρ.
The condition that all consumption price functions are mutually comparable is crucial in the
proof of Theorem 3.3. Otherwise, strongly scalable games need not be gaugeable. Theorem 3.4
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below asserts this. It states that strongly scalable games are much more general than gaugeable
games, when the consumption price functions are not mutually comparable. Hence,
gaugeable games( SSG⊆ SG⊆AWDG(NCGs.
Theorem 3.4 Let h1(·), h2(·) be two polynomials with degrees ρ1, ρ2 > 0, respectively. If ρ1 6= ρ2,
then there is a strongly scalable game that is not gaugeable and has two resources a, b ∈ A with
consumption price functions τa(·) = h1(·), τb(·) = h2(·), respectively.
By Theorem 3.4, strong scalability is indeed much more general than gaugeability. Example 3.1
below shows a scalable NCG with mutually comparable and non-regularly varying consumption
price functions. By Theorem 3.3, this game is not strongly scalable, since the consumption price
functions are not regularly varying. Thus, scalable games are more general than strongly scalable
games. As a result, we now obtain that
gaugeable games( SSG( SG⊆AWDG(NCGs.
Example 3.1 Consider a routing game with only one OD pair and two parallel arcs with mutually
comparable travel time functions as shown in Figure 2. Let {bi}i∈N be a strictly increasing sequence,
o t
4 τ(x )
3 τ(x )
Figure 2 An example of scalable games that are not strongly scalable
such that b0 = 0 and bi+1/bi → +∞ for i → +∞. The function τ(·) shared by the travel time
functions of the two arcs is continuous and non-decreasing. It is recursively defined as follows,
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• τ(x)≡ 1 for all x∈ [b0, b1),
• τ(x) = [(x− b2i+1) + 1]τ(b2i) for all x∈ [b2i+1, b2i+2), for all i∈N,
• τ(x)≡ τ(b2i) = τ(b2i−2)
[
(b2i− b2i−1) + 1
]
for all x∈ [b2i, b2i+1), for all i≥ 1,
Note that for every travel demand vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N with total travel demand T (d(n)) = bn,
there is no appropriate scaling sequence {gn}n∈N of positive numbers such that (SS1)-(SS2) of
Definition 3.2 hold. This follows since the sequence {τ(bnx)/τ(bn)}n∈N is divergent because the slope
of the linear pieces on [b2i+1, b2i+2] grows with bn for x 6= 1, and so the function τ(·) is not regularly
varying. Therefore, Theorem 3.3 implies that the game is not strongly scalable. However, the game
is scalable and thus belongs to AWDG, see the Appendix for a proof.
The above discussion concerns general NCGs, and does not assume particular properties of the
NCGs. In Subsection 3.2, we will focus the discussion on routing games with BPR travel time
functions (2.5). These games are often considered as static models of rush hour road traffic in
practice. By Corollary 3.2, we know that such games are scalable, and thus belong to AWDG.
This means that selfish routing need not be bad in a road traffic system with a huge total travel
demand.
3.2. The convergence of the PoA in routing games with BPR travel time functions
In this Subsection, we consider routing games with BPR travel time functions. We will analyze the
convergence rate of the PoA of these games.
We will first investigate the relation between SO-profiles and NE-profiles, and show that every
SO-profile is an -approximate NE-profile. The concept of -approximate NE-profiles was proposed
in Roughgarden and Tardos (2002). It models user behavior more precisely from a practical per-
spective.
Definition 3.3 A feasible strategy profile f is an -approximate NE-profile for a constant  > 0
if
τs(f) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)τa(fa)≤ (1 + )
∑
a∈A
r(a, s′)τa(fa) = (1 + )τs′(f)
for any k= 1, . . . ,K, and any s, s′ ∈ Sk with fs > 0.
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In practice, it might be difficult for individual users to detect tiny differences between the travel
times of paths (strategies). Two paths that have about the same travel times might be considered
as equally good choices. Hence, in practice, users need not follow the best NE-profile, but an
-approximate NE-profile, due to their selfishness and imprecise judgement.
Theorem 3.5 below shows that every SO-profile is a O(d−βmin)-approximate NE-profile, where
dmin = min{dk : k= 1, . . . ,K} denotes the minimum travel demand in the travel demand vector and
β ≥ 0 is the degree of the BPR-functions (2.5) that is often 4 in practice. Although the relative
ratio dmin/T may decrease as the total demand T =
∑K
k=1 dk increases, dmin itself may still increase
as the road network become more and more crowded. Thus, selfish behavior of a large number of
non-cooperative individuals will automatically approximate social optimum cost.
Theorem 3.5 Consider travel time functions τa(t) = γat
β + ηa for some constants γa > 0, ηa >
0, β ≥ 0, and all a ∈ A. Let dmin = min{dk : k = 1, . . . ,K}. Then, every SO-profile is an O(d−βmin)-
approximate NE-profile.
The proof of Theorem 3.5 actually indicates that
τs(f
∗)≤ (1 +O(d−βk )) · τs′(f∗)
for every SO-profile f∗ = (f∗s )s∈S , in which s ∈ Sk is a strategy with positive flow under f∗, and
s′ ∈ Sk is a strategy other than s, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Thus, in practice, the users of OD pairs
with large demands dk will approximately follow paths of an SO-profile, and their choices will
be independent of the choices of other users. In particular, when all OD pairs have large travel
demands, an SO-profile is an O(T−β)-approximate NE-profile.
We will show second in Theorem 3.6 that the PoA of routing games with BPR travel time
functions is of order 1+O(T−β). Thus, the PoA of routing games converges very fast to one, since β
usually equals 4 in practice. This greatly improves the convergence rate O(T−1) shown in Theorem
5.1 of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017), and also proves a conjecture of O’Hare et al. (2016) that the
PoA follows a power law for large demands.
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Theorem 3.6 Assume that τa(t) = γat
β + ηa for any a ∈A. Then, the PoA is 1 +O(T−β), where
T =
∑K
k=1 dk.
Theorem 3.7 below deepens the understanding of the convergence of the PoA in road traffic,
and provides a method for estimating the cost of both, NE-profiles and SO-profiles, when the total
travel demand T is large. In that case, the distribution of users among OD pairs will play a pivotal
role. It turns out to be the “unique” principal factor for the cost of NE-profiles and SO-profiles.
Moreover, Theorem 3.7 b) states that the distribution f˜ of an NE-profile f˜ and the distribution
f∗ of an SO-profile f∗ will be almost identical when the total travel demand T is large enough.
Theorem 3.7 Assume that τa(x) = γa · xβ + ηa for all a ∈ A with some constants γa, ηa > 0 and
β ≥ 0 independent of a, and consider a sequence {d(n) = (d(n)k )k=1,...,K}n∈N of travel demand vectors
such that the total demand T (d(n)) =
∑K
k=1 d
(n)
k →+∞ as n→+∞. If the distribution vector
d(n) =
(
d
(n)
k
)
k=1,...,K
corresponding to the given demand vector d(n) converges to a limit distribution d = (dk)k=1,...,K,
i.e., d
(n)
k =
d
(n)
k
T (d(n))
converges to dk for all OD pairs k= 1, . . . ,K, then:
a)
lim
n→+∞
C(f∗(n))(
T (d(n))
)β+1 =L(d) = limn→+∞ C(f˜ (n))(T (d(n)))β+1 > 0,
where L(d) is the cost of the unique NE-profile of the limit game Γ∞ under scaling sequence
{T (d(n))β}n∈N and user volume vector d, and where f˜ (n), f∗(n) are the NE-profile and the SO-profile
corresponding to the demand vector d(n) for all n∈N, respectively.
b) For n large enough, the distribution f∗(n) of an SO-profile f∗(n) and the distribution f˜ (n) of
an NE-profile f˜ (n) are almost identical, i.e., for every  > 0, there is an N ∈N such that
max
s∈S
∣∣f˜ (n)s −f∗(n)s ∣∣<  for all n≥N.
Theorem 3.7 a) states that the social cost L(d) of the unique NE-profile of the limit game
Γ∞ =
(
A,K,S, (r(a, s))a∈A,s∈S , (la(x) = γa ·xβ)a∈A,d
)
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depends only on the limit distribution d of users among OD pairs, and that L(d) ·T β+1 approximates
the cost of both, NE-profiles and SO-profiles, for an arbitrary travel demand vector d= (dk)k=1,...,K
with a large enough total demand T, where d= (dk)k=1,...,K is the distribution of users among OD
pairs corresponding to the vector d. Note that NE-profiles model user choices in practice. Thus,
the travel demand distribution d among OD pairs is pivotal in a road traffic system with a large
total travel demand, as it approximately determines the total travel time (social cost) of users.
The coefficients αa of the BPR-functions equal
ατa(0)
u
β
a
, see (2.5), where τa(0) is the free-flow travel
time and ua is the capacity of arc a for all a∈A. Thus,
L(d)≤
∑
s∈Sk
∑
a∈A
r(a, s)
αa · τa(0)
uβa
=:L,
since fs ∈ [0,1] and fa ∈ [0,1] for each feasible distribution f = (fs)s∈S of users among OD pairs.
Note that the constant L depends only on road conditions, i.e., on free-flow travel times τa(0) and
capacities ua, and it can thus be reduced by improving road conditions. It also provides the upper
bound L ·T β+1 to the total travel time when the total travel demand T is large.
In practice, the travel demand distribution d of users among OD pairs is actually determined by
the location of facilities in the underlying city, where facilities refer to working and living places,
hospitals, shopping malls, schools, government offices, etc. Thus, Theorem 3.7 implies that facility
locations are crucial factors for the total travel time in networks with large total travel demand T .
Suitably re-locating facilities might be an effective solution to reduce the total travel time when
the city gets crowded. So city planning should take the impact of facility locations on the travel
demand distribution into account.
4. Experimental study
Our experimental study was done with real traffic data during rush hour (7:00 a.m.–9:00 a.m.)
within the second ring road of Beijing. The demands and OD pairs were gathered from GPS data
of mobile phones. After a suitable calibration of the demands, we obtained K = 33,426 OD pairs
with total travel demand T =
∑K
k=1 dk = 101,074. Figure 3 shows the road network within that
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Figure 3 The road network within 2nd ring road of Beijing
area of Beijing, which is taken from OpenStreetMap. The network contains |V |= 4,716 nodes, and
|A|= 10,267 arcs.
To determine the PoA, we computed an SO-profile and an NE-profile for this instance, i.e., we
solved two convex programs (4.1) (for SO) and (4.2) (for NE), respectively.
min C(f) =
∑
a∈A
fa · τa(fa)
s.t.
∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk, ∀k= 1, . . . ,K,
fa−
∑
s∈S
r(a, s)fs = 0, ∀a∈A,
fs ≥ 0, ∀s∈ S.
(4.1)
min
∑
a∈A
∫ fa
0
τa(x) dx
s.t.
∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk, ∀k= 1, . . . ,K,
fa−
∑
s∈S
r(a, s)fs = 0, ∀a∈A,
fs ≥ 0, ∀s∈ S.
(4.2)
In our experiment, every τa(·) is a BPR function (2.5), where we put β = 4 and α = 0.15. The
capacity ua of an arc (street) a is computed as
street length× lane numbers
7.5
,
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where 7.5 is our estimation of the space occupied by a vehicle. The free flow travel time τa(0) on
a street a is computed as
street length
allowed maximum driving speed on the street
.
We used the software “cmcf” developed by the COGA group at Technical University of Berlin
to solve (4.1) and (4.2). The software has been successfully applied in Jahn et al. (2005) and Harks
et al. (2015) to compute SO-profiles, NE profiles, tolls for congestion prices and different traffic
patterns. For solving the convex programs, the software uses a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm
(Fukushima 1984) together with Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra 1959) for shortest paths in each
iteration.
Our implementation was done under Mac OS Sierra on a Laptop with a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7
CPU. In the implementation, we stopped the software once the current solution has an objective
value within 1% of the optimal value.
The experiment was actually carried out in two separate phases. The first phase had already
been done before conceiving this paper, and only computed the empirical PoA within the second
ring road of Beijing. Table 2 below reports the result from the first phase, which shows that the
PoA within that area of Beijing almost equals 1.0. This certainly shocked us at that time, and
motivated the study done in this paper.
PoA SO cost NE cost CPU SO (s) CPU NE (s)
1.0 1.23093000E+15 1.23083000E+15 29287.245 29307.265
Table 2 The PoA within the 2nd ring road of Beijing. Column “PoA” reports the price of anarchy, column “So
cost” reports the cost of SO-profiles, column “NE cost” reports the cost of NE-profiles, and the last two columns
report the CPU time for computing SO and NE, repectively.
The second phase was done after obtaining the theoretical results of this article, and aims to
empirically verify our theoretical findings. To this end, we took 65 different fractions of the total
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33,426 OD pairs, and ran the algorithm for every of them. To save space, we only report the
implementation results for some of the 65 fractions. Table 3 shows the results, where column
“Perc.” lists the percentage of the 33,426 OD pairs contained in a fraction, column “K” lists the
corresponding number of OD pairs of that fraction, and column “T” lists the corresponding total
travel demands of these OD pairs. For instance, for the first row in Table 3, we took 0.01% of the
33,426 OD pairs, which results in K = d33,426× 0.01%e = 4 OD pairs with total travel demand
T = 15. Table 3 shows that the PoA has already converged to 1 when K ≥ 1,003 (which accounts
for only 3% of the 33,426 OD pairs). This empirically verifies Theorem 3.2.
Perc. SO cost NE cost PoA K T
0.01% 5.92E+03 5.92E+03 1.00 4 15
0.05% 1.45E+04 1.61E+04 1.11 17 51
0.08% 1.90E+04 2.11E+04 1.11 27 77
0.10% 2.91E+04 3.30E+04 1.13 34 90
0.13% 3.45E+04 3.84E+04 1.11 44 108
0.15% 3.76E+04 4.16E+04 1.11 51 116
0.20% 4.65E+04 5.14E+04 1.10 67 146
0.25% 6.16E+04 6.75E+04 1.10 84 193
0.30% 7.56E+04 8.32E+04 1.10 101 216
0.35% 1.39E+05 1.51E+05 1.08 117 264
0.40% 1.54E+05 1.68E+05 1.09 134 343
0.45% 1.73E+05 1.89E+05 1.09 151 392
0.50% 2.62E+05 2.90E+05 1.11 168 483
0.55% 2.74E+05 3.05E+05 1.11 184 506
0.60% 3.12E+05 3.48E+05 1.12 201 550
0.65% 3.37E+05 3.75E+05 1.11 218 626
Table 3 Convergence of the PoA (To be continued on the next page)
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Perc. SO cost NE cost PoA K T
0.70% 3.51E+05 3.90E+05 1.11 234 647
0.75% 6.15E+05 6.99E+05 1.14 251 766
0.80% 6.63E+05 7.48E+05 1.13 268 792
0.85% 6.96E+05 7.86E+05 1.13 285 824
0.90% 3.65E+06 3.74E+06 1.02 301 1030
0.95% 3.75E+06 3.85E+06 1.03 318 1111
1.00% 3.84E+06 3.94E+06 1.03 335 1149
1.50% 5.12E+06 5.22E+06 1.02 502 1531
2.00% 7.73E+06 7.82E+06 1.01 669 1938
2.50% 1.43E+07 1.44E+07 1.01 836 2276
3.00% 3.81E+07 3.81E+07 1.00 1003 2726
3.50% 6.65E+07 6.65E+07 1.00 1170 3280
15.00% 1.06E+11 1.06E+11 1.00 5014 14944
20.00% 4.00E+11 4.00E+11 1.00 6686 20098
50.00% 3.71E+13 3.71E+13 1.00 16714 50038
90.00% 7.18E+14 7.18E+14 1.00 30084 90302
100.00% 1.23E+15 1.23E+15 1.00 33426 101074
Table 3: Convergence of the PoA
Figure 4 shows the plot of the PoA w.r.t. the total volume T with the data from our imple-
mentation results of the 65 fractions. Figure 4 (a) depicts the PoA with T up to 101,074, which
shows that it quickly converges to 1 as T increases. In particular, when T becomes large, the PoA
suddenly takes a steep drop and then never rebounds. This empirically verifies Theorem 3.6.
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Figure 4 (b) depicts the PoA with T below 3,000, and provides a closer look at the peak part
of Figure 4 (a). Table 3, Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4 (b) show that the PoA increases quickly with
the growth of T when T is small, i.e., T ≤ 100. However, when T gets moderately large, i.e.,
100≤ T ≤ 1,200, the PoA gets choppy. After these oscillations, i.e., T ≥ 1,200, the PoA decreases
very fast to 1.0.
Figure 5 shows the empirical plots of the SO cost and the NE cost w.r.t. T , which further verifies
the convergence of the PoA. Figure 5 (a) depicts the cost curves of SO-profiles and NE-profiles,
for T ≤ 101,074. Since the cost differences are too small compared to the corresponding demand
values, the two curves almost coincide. Figure 5 (b) depicts the two curves for T ∈ (200,2,000),
and shows that they gradually become identical as T increases. Thus, Figure 5 empirically verifies
Theorem 3.7 (b).
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Figure 4 Convergence of PoA
Figure 6 shows the empirical plot of the ratio of SO cost over T β+1 w.r.t. T with data from
the implementation results for the 65 fractions, for β = 4. It demonstrates that the ratio converges
quickly to a constant, as the total travel demand T increases. This empirically verifies Theorem
3.7 (a). Moreover, when T reaches about 2 · 104, the ratio has already converged to the constant
1.18 · 10−10, which is an estimator of L(d) in Theorem 3.7 (a). The CPU time for computing the
SO cost for T = 101,074 is about 29,307 seconds, and the CPU time for computing the SO cost
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Figure 5 Cost curves of SO-profiles and NE-profiles
for T = 20,098 is about 5,967 seconds. Thus, when we use the approximation method indicated in
Theorem 3.7 (a), we can save about 29,307−5,967
29,307
≈ 79.6% of time to compute the SO cost within the
second ring road of Beijing.
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Figure 6 The plot of C(f
∗)
Tβ+1
Besides a convincing verification of our theoretical findings, our empirical study also shows that
there is a threshold value (a saturation point), beyond which the PoA has already decreased to 1.
This saturation point seems to be at about T = 1,200, which is far below the current total travel
demand of 101,074. This means that the current traffic in Beijing is far beyond saturation, and
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user guidance policies (e.g., congestion pricing) that do not considerably change the total demand
will fail in reducing the total travel time for the huge total demand of Beijing.
5. Conclusion
We proved that every scalable game is asymptotically well designed, see Theorem 3.2. This result
generalizes the main result of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017) for gaugeable routing games. Moreover,
we proved that for some particular cases, gaugeable games coincide with strongly scalable games, see
Theorem 3.3, and that, in general, strongly scalable games are much more general than gaugeable
games, see Theorem 3.4. In addition, we showed by examples that scalable games are more general
than strongly scalable games, see Example 3.1. Altogether, our results extend and enrich the study
of Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017).
For routing games with BPR travel time functions, we proved that an SO-profile is an -
approximate NE-profile, see Theorem 3.5. Moreover, we showed for these particular games that
PoA = 1+O(d−β), see Theorem 3.6. This improves the convergence rate O(T−1) of Colini-Baldeschi
et al. (2017), and also proves a conjecture of O’Hare et al. (2016). In addition, we proved that
the distribution of users among groups is a crucial factor for the cost of both, SO-profiles and
NE-profiles, when T is large, see Theorem 3.7.
Finally, we have empirically verified our theoretical findings with real traffic data from Beijing.
Our empirical results show that the current traffic volume in Beijing is far beyond its saturation
point, which indicates that a reduction of the total travel time without reducing the travel demand
is not feasible.
Appendix. Proofs of the Theorems and Corollaries
A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1 We prove this theorem by providing a class of routing games that are
well designed (thus in AWDG), but not gaugeable. Figure 7 shows such an example. The game
consists of two groups of users, the users traveling from D to E, and the users traveling from F
to H. Except for the arc B1B2, all other edges in the graph have constant travel times that are
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shown in Figure 7. Obviously, the PoA in such a game is always 1, independent of the travel time
(or consumption price) function of arc B1B2, and independent of the user volumes of the two
groups. Therefore, such routing games are well designed. However, once the travel time function
of arc B1B2 is not regularly varying like ex, then the routing game is no longer gaugeable. For ex,
there is no regularly varying function g such that assumption (G3) holds, since no strategy (path)
of the graph will be tight in this case. 
D
F
E
H
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
B1 B2
Figure 7 An example of routing games that are not gaugeable
B. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2 Let Γ be a scalable NCG, and let {d(n)}n∈N be a sequence of user volume
vectors such that the total volume T (d(n)) increases to infinity, and
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) = lim
t→∞
sup
{
PoA(d) : T (d) = t
}
≥ lim
t→∞
inf
{
PoA(d) : T (d) = t
}≥ 1.
To show that Γ∈ AWDG, we only need to prove that
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n))≤ 1. (B.1)
Since the limit of PoA(d(n)) has been assumed to exist, (B.1) can be proved by simply showing
that (B.1) holds for an infinite subsequence of N.
For each n ∈ N, let f˜ (n), f∗(n) be, resp., an NE-profile and an SO-profile w.r.t. d(n). Recall
that d(n) =
(
d
(n)
k
)
k=1,...,K
is the distribution of users among groups w.r.t. d(n). Then, every d
(n)
k =
d
(n)
k /T (d
(n)) ∈ [0,1], f˜ (n) = (f˜ (n)s )s∈S is the distribution of users among strategies w.r.t. f˜ (n) (i.e.,
every f˜ (n)s = f˜
(n)
s /T (d
(n))∈ [0,1]), and (f˜ (n)a )a∈A is the resulting load rate vector corresponding to
(f˜ (n)a )a∈A, i.e.,
f˜ (n)a =
∑
s∈S
r(a, s) · f˜ (n)s , ∀a∈A.
This holds similarly for the distribution vector f∗(n) =
(
f∗(n)s
)
s∈S and its load rate vector
(
f∗(n)a
)
a∈A.
Since all the above normalized sequences are bounded, we can assume that:
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a1) d(n)→ d= (dk)k=1,...,K with n→∞, for some limit distribution d of users among groups.
a2) f˜ (n)→ f˜ = (f˜s)s∈S , with n→∞, for some feasible distribution f˜ of users among strategies.
a3) f∗(n)→ f∗ = (f∗s )s∈S , with n→∞. for some feasible distribution f∗ of users among strate-
gies.
Otherwise, we can take an infinite subsequence fulfilling a1)-a3).
By a2) and a3), we obtain
a4) f˜ (n)a → f˜a :=
∑
s∈S r(a, s) · f˜s with n→∞, for all a∈A, and
a5) f∗(n)a → f∗a :=
∑
s∈S r(a, s) ·f∗s with n→∞, for all a∈A.
Then,
(
f˜a
)
a∈A and
(
f∗a
)
a∈A are the load rate vectors corresponding to f˜ and f
∗, respectively. Since
Γ is scalable, we can assume that there is a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N such that (S0)-(S5) hold,
and Γ∞ is the corresponding limit game. Otherwise, we can again take an inifinite subsequence
fulfilling (S0)-(S5).
To prove (B.1), we only need to show because of (S3) and (S5) that the scaled cost
C(f˜ (n))/T (d(n)gn and the scaled cost C(f
∗(n))/T (d(n))gn converge to the cost of f˜ and the cost of
f∗, respectively, and that f˜ is an NE-profile of the limit game Γ∞.
To this end, we claim first that
τa(f˜
(n)
a )
gn
=
τa
(
T (d(n)) · f˜ (n)a
)
gn
→ la(f˜a) as n→∞, and (B.2)
τa(f
∗(n)
a )
gn
=
τa
(
T (d(n)) ·f∗(n)a
)
gn
→ la(f∗a ) as n→∞, (B.3)
for all a∈A with limit price function la(·) 6≡+∞. Here, we only prove (B.2). (B.3) follows with an
almost identical argument.
Note that f˜a, f˜
(n)
a ∈ Ia for all n ∈N and all a ∈A, where we recall that Ia is the closed interval
including all admissible load rates of resource a. By a4), for any  > 0, there exist f−a ,f
+
a ∈ Ia such
that f+a −f−a < , f−a ≤ f˜a ≤ f+a , and f−a ≤ f˜ (n)a ≤ f+a for large enough n∈N. Therefore, we obtain
for large enough n∈N that
τa
(
T (d(n)) ·f−a
)
gn
≤ τa(f˜
(n)
a )
gn
≤ τa
(
T (d(n)) ·f+a
)
gn
,
since τa(·) is nondecreasing. Letting n→∞, we get that
la(f
−
a )≤ lim
n→∞
τa(f˜
(n)
a )
gn
≤ lim
n→∞
τa(f˜
(n)
a )
gn
≤ la(f+a ).
Then (B.2) is proved by letting → 0, and observing that f+a − f−a < , f−a ≤ f˜a ≤ f+a , and that
la(x) is continuous at x= f˜a, see assumption (S2).
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We will now prove first that the scaled cost
C(f˜ (n))
T (d(n))gn
=
∑K
k=1
∑
s∈SkT (d
(n))·f˜ (n)s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s)·τa
(
T (d(n))·f˜ (n)a
)
T (d(n))gn
converges to the limit cost L(f˜), where
L(f˜):=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Stight
k
f˜s
∑
a∈Atight
r(a, s) · la(f˜a):=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Stight
k
f˜s ·Ls(f˜)<+∞, (B.4)
and second that f˜ = (f˜s)s∈S is actually an NE-profile of the limit game Γ∞.
To this end, consider a non-negligible group k ∈ {1, . . . .K} and a non-tight s ∈ Sk\Stight with
f˜s > 0. Then, (2.1) and the definition of a tight strategy , see (S3), yield that the limit price of s
w.r.t. f˜ is +∞, i.e.,
Ls(f˜) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · la(f˜a) = +∞.
By (B.2) and assumption (S3), the limit price Ls′(f˜) = limn→∞ τs′(f˜ (n))/gn <+∞ for every tight
strategy s′ ∈ Stight. Therefore, f˜s = limn→∞ f˜ (n)s = 0 for each k = 1, . . . ,K and each non-tight
strategy s∈ Sk\Stight, since all f˜ (n) are NE-profiles and we assumed that every non-negligible group
k has at least one tight strategy.
Moreover, for all k= 1, . . . ,K, the total limit cost of a non-tight strategy s∈ Sk\Stight must be 0,
i.e.,
lim
n→∞
f˜ (n)s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τa
(
T (d(n)) · f˜ (n)a
)
gn
= 0. (B.5)
Otherwise, there must exist a subsequence {ni}i∈N such that for all tight strategies s′ ∈ Stightk ,
Ls′(f˜)<Ls(f˜) = lim
i→∞
∑
a∈A r(a, s) · τa
(
T (d(ni)) · f˜ (ni)a
)
gni
= +∞, (B.6)
lim
i→∞
f˜ (ni)s ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s)·τa
(
T (d(ni)) · f˜ (ni)a
)
gni
>0. (B.7)
Then, (B.6) implies that, for large enough i,
f˜ (ni)s = f˜
(ni)
s /T (d
(ni))≡ 0,
again since all f˜ (ni) are NE-profiles and every group has at least one tight strategy (see (S3)).
This contradicts (B.7). Therefore, (B.5) holds, which means that we can ignore non-tight strategies
when we consider NE-profiles of the limit game Γ∞. Note also that we can igonore these negligible
groups. Altogether, we obtain that (B.4) holds, and that f˜ is a feasible profile of the limit game
Γ∞.
We now prove that f˜ is an NE profile of Γ∞. For any k = 1, . . . ,K, and any two strategies
s, s′ ∈ Sk with f˜s > 0, we need to show that Ls(f˜) ≤ Ls′(f˜) for the limit price, i.e., s is cheaper
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than s′ w.r.t. the feasible profile f˜ of the limit game. Since f˜s > 0, we obtain that f˜ (n)s > 0 for n
large enough. Therefore, f˜ (n)s = T (d
(n)) · f˜ (n)s > 0 for large enough n. Since all f˜ (n) are NE-profiles,
τs(f˜
(n))≤ τs′(f˜ (n)) for large enough n. Then τs(f˜ (n))/gn ≤ τs′(f˜ (n))/gn for large enough n. Letting
n→∞, we obtain that Ls(f˜) ≤ Ls′(f˜). Therefore, f˜ is an NE-profile of the limit game Γ∞. By
(S4), f˜ is also an SO-profile of the limit game. So, L(f˜)≤L(µ) for every feasible profile µ of the
limit game. By (S5), the limit cost L(f˜)> 0.
By the facts that C(f˜ (n))≥C(f∗(n)) for all n∈N, that 0<L(f˜)<+∞, that la(·) is continuous,
and by (B.3), we obtain through an argument similar to the above for non-tight strategies that
the scaled cost
C(f∗(n))
T (d(n))gn
=
∑K
k=1
∑
s∈SkT (d
(n))·f∗(n)·∑a∈Ar(a, s)·τa(T (d(n))·f∗(n)a )
T (d(n))gn
converges to the limit cost L(f∗), where
L(f∗)=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Stight
k
f∗s
∑
a∈Atight
r(a, s)la(f
∗
a )=
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Stight
k
f∗s ·Ls(f∗)<+∞, (B.8)
and that f∗ is a feasible profile (actually an SO-profile) of the limit game Γ∞. Hence, 0<L(f˜)≤
L(f∗)≤L(f˜)<+∞. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
PoA(d(n)) = lim
n→∞
C(f˜ (n))
C(f∗(n))
= lim
n→∞
C(f˜(n))
T (d(n))gn
C(f∗(n))
T (d(n))gn
=
L(f˜)
L(f∗)
≤ 1,
which proves (B.1). 
C. Proof of Corollary 3.1
Proof of Corollary 3.1 We now consider a gaugeable game Γ with a regularly varying gauge
function g. Let {d(n)}n∈N be a sequence of user volume vectors with limn→∞ T (d(n)) = +∞. We
define a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N by putting gn := g
(
T (d(n))
)
. Using Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017)
and the regular variability of the function g(·), we obtain that
la(x) := lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n)) ·x)
gn
= ca ·xρ
for all x≥ 0 and all a∈A, where
ca = lim
x→∞
τa(x)
g(x)
is a non-negative constant or +∞, and ρ≥ 0 is a constant such that for all x> 0
lim
t→∞
g(tx)
g(x)
= xρ.
We need to show (S3)-(S5).
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By (G3) and the gaugeability of Γ, we obtain that every group has a tight strategy s∈ Sk such
that, for all resources a∈A with r(a, s)> 0, la(x) = ca ·xρ ∈ [0,+∞) for all x≥ 0. Thus (S3) holds.
Let Γ∞ be the limit game as defined in (S4). Obviously, Γ∞ is in WDG, since all consumption
prices functions of Γ∞ are of the form ca ·xρ for all a∈Atight and some constant ρ independent of
resources a. Thus, (S4) holds for every user volume vector that is a limit of the distribution vector
sequence {d(n)}n∈N corresponding to the above fixed user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
Since the proportion of tight groups in the total travel volume is non-negligible, see (G4), Γ has
at least one tight group k such that limn→+∞ d
(n)
k > 0. Recall that a group k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is called
tight if
min
s∈Sk
max{ca : a∈A, and r(a, s)> 0} ∈ (0,+∞),
see (G4) for more details. Let k0 be a tight group with limn→+∞ d
(n)
k0
> 0. Then, Sk0 ∩ Stight 6= ∅,
and there must exist a resource a ∈ Sk0 for each s ∈ Sk0 such that r(a, s) > 0 and ca ∈ (0,+∞].
Therefore, the total limit cost of group k0 is positive w.r.t. any profile f = (fs)s∈Stight that is
feasible under some limit d of the distribution vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N, i.e.,∑
s∈Sk0
fs ·
∑
a∈Atight
r(a, s) · la(fa) =
∑
s∈Sk0
fs ·
∑
a∈Atight
r(a, s) · ca ·fρa > 0.
Recall that fa is the load rate of a w.r.t. fs. Thus, for every user volume vector d that is a limit of
the distribution vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N, the NE-profiles of Γ∞ w.r.t. the user volume vector d
have positive cost. So, (S5) holds for every user volume vector d that is a limit of the distribution
vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N.
Since (S1)-(S3) hold for the whole sequence {d(n)}n∈N, and (S4)-(S5) hold for every subsequence
{dni}i∈N for which the corresponding distribution vector sequence {dni}i∈N converges to a limit
distribution d, we obtain that Γd is scalable. 
D. Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof of Corollary 3.2 We assume, w.l.o.g., that τa(x) = αax
β +
∑m
i=1αa,ix
βi + c0 for all a∈A,
and some constants αa > 0, β ≥ 0,0≤ βi < β. For any user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N with
total volume T (d(n))→+∞ as n→∞, we can define a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N by putting gn :=(
T (d(n))
)β
for all n∈N. Then, we obtain that
la(x) = lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n))x
)
gn
= αa ·xβ ∈ (0,+∞)
for all a ∈A and all x≥ 0. By a similar argument to the poof of Corollary 3.1, we can then show
that the given game is scalable. 
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E. Proof of Corollary 3.3
Proof of Corollary 3.3 Let {d(n)}n∈N be a sequence of travel demand vectors such that
lim
n→∞
T (d(n)) = +∞.
Let b be a dominating arc of the given game, and set gn := τb(T (d
(n))) for each n∈N. Since b is a
dominating arc, it follows that the load rate fb ≡ 1, that
la(fa) = lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n))fa
)
gn
= lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n))fa
)
τb
(
T (d(n)fb
) ≡ 0 ∀a∈A\{b} ∀fa ∈ Ia, and that
lb(fb) = lim
n→∞
τb
(
T (d(n))fb
)
gn
≡ 1.
Since b ∈ s for all paths s ∈ S, all paths and all OD pairs are tight. The limit game has constant
travel times on all arcs. Therefore, it belongs to WDG, and Theorem 3.2 applies. 
F. Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof of Theorem 3.3 (⇐) This direction is similar to the proof of Corollary 3.1, when we
observe that all τa(·) are mutually comparable and have the same exponent ρ > 0, and are thus
gaugeable.
(⇒) To show that all τa(·) are regularly varying and have the same exponent ρ> 0, we only need
to show by Karamata’s Characterization Theorem (see Bingham et al. (1987)) that
lim
t→∞
τa(tx)
τa(t)
= h(x)∈ (0,+∞) (F.1)
for all x∈ (0,+∞), all a∈A, and some function h(·) independent of resources a.
Let a∗ ∈A be an arbitrarily fixed resource. Since the consumption price functions are mutually
comparable, (F.1) follows already if we show that there exists a function ha∗(x) for a
∗ ∈ A such
that
lim
t→+∞
τa∗(tx)
τa∗(t)
=ha∗(x)∈(0,+∞) ∀x> 0. (F.2)
Then, we obtain for all x> 0 and any a∈A that
lim
t→+∞
τa(tx)
τa(t)
= lim
t→+∞
τa(tx)
τa∗(tx)
· τa∗(tx)
τa∗(t)
· τa∗(t)
τa(t)
= lim
t→+∞
τa∗(tx)
τa∗(t)
=ha∗(x)∈(0,+∞),
where mutual comparability gives
lim
x→+∞
τa(x)
τa∗(x)
= ca,a∗ and lim
x→+∞
τa∗(x)
τa(x)
=
1
ca,a∗
for some constant ca,a∗ ∈ (0,+∞). Thus, we only need to find a suitable a∗ ∈ A such that the
function ha∗(·) required by (F.2) exists.
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Since the game Γ is strongly scalable, there exist for every user volume vector sequence {d(n)}n∈N
with limn→∞ T (d(n)) = +∞ a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N of positive numbers and a limit price func-
tion vector (la)a∈A such that
lim
n→∞
τa
(
T (d(n)
) ·x)
gn
= la(x), ∀a∈A ∀x> 0,
where la(·) is either a non-negative, non-decreasing and continuous real function, or la(x)≡+∞
for all x> 0, see (SS1). Now, let {d(n)}n∈N be an arbitrarily fixed sequence of user volume vectors
of the game Γ, {gn}n∈N be a scaling sequence, and (la)a∈A be the corresponding vector of limit
price functions.
By (SS3.1), there exists at least one resource a∈A such that la(x)∈ (0,+∞) for all x> 0. Let a∗
be such a resource. We will now construct the limit ha∗(·) satisfying (F.2). For the fixed sequence
{d(n)}n∈N, we obtain that
lim
n→∞
τa∗(T (d
(n))x)
τa∗(T (d(n)))
=
limn→∞
τa∗ (T (d(n))x)
gn
limn→∞
τa∗ (T (d(n)))
gn
=
la∗(x)
la∗(1)
=: ha∗(x)∈ (0,+∞) ∀x> 0.
To complete the proof, we still need to show that ha∗ is independent of the choice of {d(n)}n∈N.
The following argument asserts this.
Arbitrarily fix two user volume vector sequences {d(n)1 }n∈N and {d(n)2 }n∈N such that T (d(n)1 )→+∞
and T (d
(n)
2 )→ +∞ as n→ +∞. We consider two limit functions, h(i)a∗ (·), i = 1,2, such that for
i= 1,2,
lim
n→∞
τa∗(T (d
(n)
i )x)
τa∗(T (d
(n)
i ))
= h
(i)
a∗ (x)∈ (0,+∞) ∀x> 0.
We now define a new user volume sequence {d(n)}n∈N by merging the two user volume vector
sequences, i.e., d(2m) = d
(m)
1 and d
(2m+1) = d
(m)
2 for all m∈N. Then, also T (d(n))→+∞ as n→+∞.
By the above discussion, there also exists a limit function ha∗(·) such that
lim
n→∞
τa∗(T (d
(n))x)
τa∗(T (d(n)))
= ha∗(x)∈ (0,+∞) ∀x> 0.
This implies that h
(1)
a∗ (x) = ha∗(x) = h
(2)
a∗ (x) for all x> 0, since {d(n)i }n∈N, i= 1,2, are subsequences
of {d(n)}n∈N. Therefore, the limit ha∗(·) is independent of the choice of {d(n)}n∈N. This completes
the proof. 
G. Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof of Theorem 3.4 We give a proof for h1(x) = 2x+ 1 and h2(x) = 4x
2 + 1 that are generic
for general polynomials with different degrees. Figure 8 shows a routing game Γ with two OD pairs
and four parallel paths (arcs). The four polynomials above the four arcs are their travel time
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O1
O2 t 2
t 1
2 x+1
3 x+1
4 x2+1
5 x2+1
Figure 8 A example of a strongly scalable game that is not gaugeable
functions, respectively. The user volumes of the game Γ have a particular property that d1 · d2 = 0
for every user volume vector d = (d1, d2), where d1 denotes the user volume of the top OD pair
and d2 denotes the user volume of the bottom OD pair. The following argument shows that Γ is
strongly scalable, but not gaugeable.
Consider now a sequence {d(n) = (d(n)1 , d(n)2 )}n∈N of user volume vectors with total volume
T (d(n)) = d
(n)
1 + d
(n)
2 →∞ as n→∞, where d(n)1 denotes the user volume of the top OD pair and
d
(n)
2 denotes the user volume of the bottom OD pair for each n ∈N. Then, d(n)1 · d(n)2 = 0 holds for
every n∈N.
Gaugeability requires a uniform gauge function g for all possible user volume vector sequences.
(G3) and (G4) then imply that there is at least one tight group accounting for an negligible
proportion of the total user volume as the total user volume approaches infinity, and that every
OD pair has at least one tight strategy. A legal gaugeable function g of Γ thus must satisfy the
condition that the limit limx→+∞ g(x)/x2 exists and is in (0,+∞). In particular, this requires that
the second (bottom) OD pair must be tight and limn→+∞ d
(n)
2 = limn→∞ d
(n)
2 /T (d
(n))> 0. However,
our assumptions permit that limn→∞ d
(n)
2 = 0. Thus, Γ is not gaugeable.
We now show that Γ is strongly scalable. Since d
(n)
1 · d(n)2 = 0 and T (d(n)) = d(n)1 + d(n)2 →∞ as
n→∞, we can an infinite subsequence {ni}i∈N such that either
d
(ni)
1 ≡ 0 ∀i∈N, T (d(ni)) = d(ni)2 →∞ as i→∞ or (G.1)
d
(ni)
2 ≡ 0 ∀i∈N, T (d(ni)) = d(ni)1 →∞ as i→∞. (G.2)
The following will prove the strong scalability of Γ according to the two cases (G.1) and (G.2).
(Case I: d
(ni)
1 ≡ 0) We define scaling factors gn = T (d(n))2 for each n∈N. Then, the limit price
functions of the first (top) OD pair equal the constant function 0, and the limit price functions
of the second (bottom) OD pair equals 4x2 and 5x2 respectively. Thus, (SS1) holds. It is easy to
check that (SS2) also holds w.r.t. the subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N.
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(Case II: d
(ni)
2 ≡ 0) We set the scaling factor gn = T (d(n)) for every n∈N. Then, the limit price
functions of the first (top) OD pairs are
lim
n→+∞
2(d
(n)
1 + d
(n)
2 )x
d
(n)
1
= 2x, and lim
n→+∞
3(d
(n)
1 + d
(n)
2 )x
d
(n)
1
= 3x.
The limit price functions of the second (bottom) OD pair equal +∞. Thus, the second OD pair
does not have tight strategies under this scaling sequence {gn}n∈N. However, the second OD pair
is negligible for this subsequence {d(ni)}i∈N since d(ni)2 ≡ 0 for all i∈N. Thus, (SS1)-(SS2) hold.
In summary, we can find a scaling sequence {gn}n∈N for any sequence {d(n)}n∈N of user volume
vectors of Γ such that (SS1)-(SS2) hold. Thus Γ is strongly scalable. 
H. Proof of Example 3.1
Proof of Example 3.1 Let {d(n)}n∈N be a sequence of travel demand vectors with total demand
T (d(n))→+∞ as n→+∞. Then, there is an infinite subsequence {nq}q∈N such that either
∀q ∈N ∃i∈N T (d(nq))∈ [b2i, b2i+1)
or
∀q ∈N ∃i∈N T (d(nq))∈ [b2i+1, b2i+2).
To facilitate the discussion, we assume w.o.l.g. that T (d(2i))∈ [b2i, b2i+1) for all i∈N.
We now consider the subsequence {d(2i)}i∈N. Note that
lim
i→+∞
T (d(2i))
b2i
=: κ,
for some constant κ≥ 1 or +∞. We assume that
lim
i→+∞
T (d(2i))/b2i = lim
i→+∞
T (d(2i))/b2i = κ.
Otherwise, we can take a suitable subsequence and this does not affect our further discussion. We
will now construct a scaling sequence {gi}i∈N and the resulting two limit price functions for the
subsequence {d(2i)}i∈N.
There are three cases: κ= 1, κ= +∞, and κ∈ (1,+∞).
(Case 1: κ= 1) If κ= 1, then we obtain for any x∈ (0,1) that b2i−1 <xT (d(2i))< b2i for i large
enough, since b2i/b2i−1→+∞ and T (d(2i))/b2i→ κ= 1 as i→+∞. Therefore, for all x∈ (0,1),
lim
i→∞
τ
(
T (d(2i))x
)
τ(b2i)
= lim
i→∞
τ(b2i−1)
[
(T (d(2i))x− b2i−1) + 1
]
τ(b2i)
= lim
i→∞
τ(b2i−1)
[
(T (d(2i))x− b2i−1) + 1
]
τ(b2i−1)
[
(b2i− b2i−1) + 1
]
= lim
i→∞
[
(T (d(2i))x− b2i−1) + 1
][
(b2i− b2i−1) + 1
] = x,
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where we use again that limi→∞ b2i/b2i−1 = +∞ and κ = limi→∞ T (d(2i))/b2i = 1. Therefore, we
obtain with scaling factor gi = τ(b(2i)) that τ(T (d
(2i))x)/gi→ x with i→∞ for all x∈ [0,1], which,
in turn, implies that the limit game is in WDG.
(Case 2: κ = +∞) We can show similarly that limi→+∞ τ
(
T (d(2i))x
)
/τ(T (d(2i))) = 1 for all
x ∈ [0,1], since b2i ≤ T (d(2i))x ≤ T (d(2i)) < b2i+1 for large enough i for all x ∈ (0,1] in this case.
Therefore, we put gi = τ(T (d
(2i))) in this case. Then l(x)≡ 1 for all x∈ [0,1] and the limit game is
in WDG.
(Case 3: κ ∈ (1,+∞)) In this case, b2i < T (d(2i))x < T (d(2i)) < b2i+1 for all i large enough for
x > 1/κ, and b2i−1 < T (d(2i))x < b2i < T (d(2i))< b2i+1 for all i large enough for 0< x < κ. For all
x> 1/κ, we obtain that
lim
i→+∞
τ(T (d(2i))x)
τ(T (d(2i)))
= lim
i→+∞
τ(b2i)
τ(b2i)
≡ 1.
For 0<x< 1/κ, we obtain that
lim
i→+∞
τ(T (d(2i))x)
τ(T (d(2i)))
= lim
i→+∞
τ(b2i−2)
[
(T (d(2i))x− b2i−1) + 1
]
τ(b2i−2)
[
(b2i− b2i−1) + 1
] = κ ·x.
For x = 1/κ, we use the fact that τ(T (d
(2i))x1)
τ(T (d(2i)))
≤ τ(T (d(2i))/κ)
τ(T (d(2i)))
≤ τ(T (d(2i))x2)
τ(T (d(2i)))
for all x1 ∈ [0,1/κ) and
x2 ∈ (1/κ,1], and obtain that
lim
i→+∞
τ(T (d(2i))/κ)
τ(T (d(2i)))
= 1.
So, if we take gi = τ(T (d
(2i))), then
l(x) =
{
κ ·x if x∈ [0,1/κ),
1 if x∈ [1/κ,1],
which is again continuous and nondecreasing. The limit game then has travel time functions 4l(x)
and 3l(x), and PoA = 1. 
I. Proof of Theorem 3.5
Proof of Theorem 3.5 Suppose that f∗ is an SO-profile. Then, we obtain for any k = 1, . . . ,K
and any s, s′ ∈ Sk with f∗s > 0 that∑
a∈A
r(a, s) · (τa(f∗a ) + f∗a · τ ′a(f∗a ))≤∑
a∈A
r(a, s′) · (τa(f∗a ) + f∗a · τ ′a(f∗a )),
where τ ′a(·) is the first-order derivative of τa(·), see Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) for a proof of
the above condition. Note that
τa(f
∗
a ) + f
∗
a · τ ′a(f∗a ) = γa · (f∗a )β + ηa +β · γa · (f∗a )β = (1 +β) · τa(f∗a )−β · ηa
for any a∈A. Therefore, we obtain further that
(1 +β) · τs(f∗)−β · τs(0)≤ (1 +β) · τs′(f∗)−β · τs′(0),
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for any k = 1, . . . ,K and any s, s′ ∈ Sk with f∗s > 0, where 0 = (0)p∈S represents the zero flow.
Regrouping terms, we obtain that
τs(f
∗)≤ τs′(f∗) ·
(
1 +
β · (τs(0)− τs′(0))
(1 +β) · τs′(f∗)
)
≤ τs′(f∗) ·
(
1 +
β · ∣∣τs(0)− τs′(0)∣∣
(1 +β) · τs′(f∗)
)
,
for any k= 1, . . . ,K, any s, s′ ∈ Sk with f∗s > 0.
Since |S|<∞ and |A|<∞, there is a constant κ> 0 such that
∣∣τs(0)− τs′(0)∣∣≤ κ,
for any k= 1, . . . ,K, any s, s′ ∈ Sk, and thus
τs(f
∗)≤ τs′(f∗) ·
(
1 +
β ·κ
(1 +β) · τs′(f∗)
)
.
It remains to bound τs′(f
∗) from below.
Observe that
max{f∗s′′ : s′′ ∈ Sk} ≥
dk
|Sk| ≥
dmin
|Sk| →∞
as dmin→∞, for any k= 1, . . . ,K. For every k= 1, . . . ,K, let s∗k ∈ Sk be the strategy such that
f∗s∗
k
= max{f∗s′′ : s′′ ∈ Sk} ∈Ω(dmin).
Then, for any k= 1, . . . ,K,
τs∗
k
(f∗) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s∗k) · τa(f∗a ) =
∑
a∈A
r(a, s∗k) ·
(
γa · (f∗a )β + ηa
)
=
∑
a∈A
r(a, s∗k) ·
(
γa ·
( K∑
l=1
∑
s∈Sl
r(a, s) · f∗s
)β
+ ηa
)
≥
∑
a∈A
r(a, s∗k) ·
(
γa ·
(
r(a, s∗k) · f∗s∗
k
)β
+ ηa
)
∈Ω(dβmin).
Therefore, for any k= 1, . . . ,K, and any s′ ∈ Sk, we obtain that
τs′(f
∗)≥ τs∗
k
(f∗) +β · τs′(0)− τs
∗
k
(0)
1 +β
∈Ω(dβmin).
In summary, we obtain that
τs(f
∗)≤ τs′(f∗) ·
(
1 +O
( βκ
β+ 1
d−βmin
))
, (I.1)
for any k= 1, . . . ,K, any s, s′ ∈ Sk with fs > 0. This completes the proof. 
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J. Proof of Theorem 3.6
Proof of Theorem 3.6 Let f∗ be an SO-profile, and f˜ an NE-profile.
Note that the price functions τa(·) are convex. Because of the K.K.T. conditions, f˜ is an optimal
solution to the non-linear program (J.1).
minimize
∑
a∈A
∫ fa
0
τa(t)dt
s.t.
∑
s∈Sk
fs = dk, for all k= 1, . . . ,K, (J.1)
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
r(a, s)fs = fa, for all a∈A,
fs ≥ 0, for all s∈ S.
We then obtain that
0≥
∑
a∈A
∫ f˜a
0
τa(t)dt−
∑
a∈A
∫ f∗a
0
τa(t)dt
=
∑
a∈A
[∫ f˜a
0
τa(t)dt−
∫ f∗a
0
τa(t)dt
]
.
(J.2)
Since τa(x) = γa ·xβ + ηa for all a∈A, we obtain for any feasible profile h= (hs)s∈S that∑
a∈A
∫ ha
0
τa(t)dt=
∑
a∈A
1
β+ 1
τa(ha) ·ha + β
β+ 1
∑
a∈A
τa(0) ·ha
=
∑
a∈A
1
β+ 1
τa(ha) ·ha + β
β+ 1
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0) ·hs
=
1
β+ 1
C(h) +
β
β+ 1
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0) ·hs.
(J.3)
Plugging (J.3) into (J.2) with h= f∗ and h= f˜ respectively yields
0≥ 1
β+ 1
(
C(f˜)−C(f∗))+ β
β+ 1
[ K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0)f˜s−
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0)f
∗
s
]
,
which in turn implies that
1≤PoA≤1+
β
∣∣∣∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f˜s−∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f∗s ∣∣∣
C(f∗)
.
Now, we will show that
β
∣∣∣∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f˜s−∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f∗s ∣∣∣
C(f∗)
∈O(T−β), (J.4)
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which implies that PoA = 1 +O(T−β).
We define
Lmax = max{τs(0) : s∈ S}, and Lmin = min{τs(0) : s∈ S}.
Obviously, Lmax and Lmin are constants independent of T =
∑K
k=1 dk, and
β
∣∣∣ K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0)f˜s−
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
τs(0)f
∗
s
∣∣∣≤ β(Lmax−Lmin) K∑
k=1
dk. (J.5)
Note that there is some s∗ ∈ S such that f∗s∗ ≥
∑K
k=1 dk
|S| =
T
|S| ∈ Ω(T ). Note also that C(f∗) ≥
f∗s∗τs∗(f
∗) = f∗s∗ ·
∑
a∈A r(a, s
∗)τa(f∗a ). Since we assume (2.1), we obtain that∑
a∈A
r(a, s∗)τa(f
∗
a )≥ γmin ·
(
f∗s∗
)β
+ ηmin ≥ γmin r
β
min ·T β
|S|β + ηmin,
where γmin = min{γa : a ∈ A} > 0, ηmin = min{ηa : a ∈ A} > 0, rmin = min{r(a, s) : a ∈ A,s ∈
S with r(a, s)> 0}> 0. Observe also the fact that f∗a ≥ r(a, s∗)f∗s∗ for any a ∈A with r(a, s∗)> 0.
Therefore, we obtain that
C(f∗)≥ γmin r
β
min ·T β+1
|S|β+1 . (J.6)
With (J.5), (J.6), and the fact that T =
∑K
k=1 dk, we finally obtain that
β
∣∣∣∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f˜s−∑Kk=1∑s∈Sk τs(0)f∗s ∣∣∣
C(f∗)
∈O(T−β),
which completes the proof. 
K. Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof of Theorem 3.7 a) We will only prove a) for the sequence {f˜ (n)}n∈N of NE-profiles. An
almost identical argument applies to the sequence {f∗(n)}n∈N of SO-profiles. We first claim that
the distribution vector f˜ (n) of NE-profiles converges to a limit distribution f˜ =
(
f˜s
)
s∈S .
Claim 1. There exists a limit distribution f˜ = (f˜s)s∈S such that
f˜ (n)→ f˜ as n→+∞.
Proof of Claim 1 We only need to prove the convergence of f˜ (n)s for an arbitrarily fixed s∈ S.
Since the sequence {f˜ (n)s }n∈N is bounded, there exist two infinite subsequences {ni}i∈N and {mi}i∈N
such that
f
s
= lim
i→∞
f˜ (ni)s = lim
n→∞
f˜ (n)s ≤ lim
n→∞
f˜ (n)s = lim
i→∞
f˜ (mi)s = f s.
For the subsequence {ni}i∈N, there exists an infinite subsubsequence {nij}j∈N, such that the f˜
nij
s
converges to a distribution vector f , again because of the boundedness. Therefore, we assume,
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w.o.l.g., that f˜ (ni)s itself converges to f , and f˜
(mi)
s converges to a distribution vector f respectively,
otherwise we can take subsequences fulfilling this assumption.
Now we consider the two limit games with scaling sequences gi =
(
T (d(ni))
)β
and hi =
(
T (d(mi))
)β
respectively. Note that these two limit games coincide under scalings
(
T (d(ni))
)β
and
(
T (d(mi))
)β
,
respectively, since they have the same demand vector d, the same resource set A, the same strategy
set S, and also the same travel time functions la(fa) = γa · fβa for all a ∈ A. Since the la(fa) are
strictly convex, the common limit game has a unique NE-profile. We have shown in the proof of
Theorem 3.2 that if the game is scalable and the distribution sequence corresponding to NE-profiles
converges, then the limit of the distribution sequence is an NE-profile of the limit game. Therefore,
both f and f are NE-profiles of the limit game, which, by the uniqueness argument, implies that
f = f . Then f s = f s. Therefore f˜
(n)
s converges. 
Let L(d)> 0 denote the social cost of the unique NE-profile in the limit game with demand vector
d. Note that L(d) depends only the demand vector d. Since {d(n)}n∈N and {f˜ (n)}n∈N converge and
the limit game is in WDG, we obtain from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that
lim
n→∞
C(f˜ (n))(
T (d(n))
)β+1 =L(d)> 0.
b) Note that {f∗(n)}n∈N also converges as n→+∞. This can be proved by a similar argument
to that for Claim 1. Since the limit game has strictly convex travel time functions la(fa) = f
β
a and
is in WDG, we obtain that both f˜ (n) and f∗(n) converge to the same limit distribution f that
is the unique NE-profile (also the unique SO-profile) of the limit game. Altogether, this proves
Theorem 3.7. 
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